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Legal Issues in Medicine

T HE S HADOWLANDS — S ECRETS ,
L IES , AND A SSISTED R EPRODUCTION
GEORGE J. ANNAS, J.D., M.P.H.

A

MERICANS love babies and technology, and
most Americans applaud the ability of the
new assisted-reproduction techniques to help
infertile couples have children. But these techniques
have also given birth to a wide variety of new legal
issues, including questions about the identity of the
mother and father of the child, the enforcement of
preconception contracts, the elements of informed
consent, and the disposition of frozen embryos. After almost 20 years of experience and the growth of
infertility clinics into a multibillion-dollar industry,
it is time to consider establishing national standards
and a federal regulatory scheme. Two recent court
cases, one in California and the other in New York,
and the report of the New York State Task Force on
Life and the Law suggest that existing practices are
inadequate to protect the interests of clinic patients
and their children.
PARENTLESS IN CALIFORNIA

The California case involved Luanne and John
Buzzanca, who used in vitro fertilization (IVF) with
donor eggs and donor sperm.1 The embryos were
subsequently implanted in a genetically unrelated
woman (the “surrogate” mother) for gestation and
birth. The Buzzancas intended to rear the resulting
child as their own. Before the child, Jaycee, was
born, the couple separated and John wanted to have
nothing to do with the child.
At a trial held to determine the legal parents of
Jaycee, the identity of the genetic parents remained
secret, and the gestational mother disclaimed any interest in the child. Because neither John nor Luanne
was genetically or biologically related to Jaycee, the
judge concluded that Jaycee was parentless. In my
view, the conclusion — that a child with six potential parents (assuming the gestational mother was
married) was legally parentless — was untenable.2
This decision was properly reversed on appeal.
The appeals court decided that because, under
California law, a husband who consents to his wife’s
artificial insemination becomes the legal father of
the child, “a husband and wife [should be] deemed
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the lawful parents of a child after a surrogate bears
a biologically unrelated child on their behalf . . .
[since] in each instance a child is procreated because
a medical procedure was initiated and consented to
by intended parents.”1 Thus, the court concluded
that Luanne and John were Jaycee’s legal parents.
To make sure no one missed the analogy, the
court expanded on it, stating that gestational surrogacy and artificial insemination are “exactly analogous in this crucial respect: both contemplate the
procreation of a child by the consent to a medical
procedure of someone who intends to raise the child
but who otherwise does not have any biological
tie.”1 The court did not like the idea of people who
are responsible for the creation of a child “turning
around and disclaiming any responsibility after the
child is born.”1 Since the court believed that John
“caused” the birth of Jaycee simply by signing a contract, the court had no problem concluding that the
same logic that made him the legal father made Luanne (his wife at the time the contract with the surrogate mother was signed) the legal mother, since
she agreed to the “procreative project” at the start.
The appeals court nonetheless concluded that it
would be preferable for the legislature to set the
rules in this arena: “We still believe it is the Legislature . . . which is the more desirable forum for
lawmaking.”1 And at the end of its opinion, the
court tried to reassure John, now the legal father,
that things might work out for the best. The court
conceded that John may have agreed to the surrogate-mother arrangement simply “as an accommodation to allow Luanne to surmount a formality” but
observed that “human relationships are not static;
things done merely to help one individual overcome
a perceived legal obstacle sometimes become much
more meaningful.”1 Of course, there is no legal basis
for such musings, and the court resorted to citing
literature to bolster its opinion. It referred approvingly to Shadowlands, a play about the life of C.S.
Lewis and his marriage to an American citizen, Joy
Gresham, which was arranged so that she could stay
in England.3 Just as a deeper relationship developed
between Lewis and Gresham, the court seemed to
be saying, a deeper relationship may develop between John and Jaycee, if not between John and his
former wife, Luanne.
NEW YORK’S FROZEN EMBRYOS

The New York case involved an attempt by Maureen
Kass and her husband, Steven, to have a baby by
means of IVF.4 Maureen had previously undergone
five egg-retrieval procedures and nine embryo transfers; none resulted in a live birth. Before the 10th
and final attempt, for which Maureen’s sister agreed
to try to carry the couple’s embryos, the couple
signed four consent forms. Included in an addendum to one of the forms was the statement that if
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the couple “no longer wish to initiate a pregnancy
or are unable to make a decision regarding the disposition of our stored, frozen pre-zygotes . . . [they]
may be disposed of by the IVF program for approved research investigation as determined by the
IVF program.”4 Maureen’s sister failed to become
pregnant, and the couple subsequently decided to
divorce.
Maureen then sought sole custody of the remaining
frozen embryos so that she could undergo another
implantation procedure. Steven opposed her request. The trial court granted custody of the embryos to Maureen, but an appeals court reversed this
ruling in a split decision; the majority of the judges
held that the provision that the embryos be turned
over for research should be enforced.5 This decision
was appealed to New York’s highest court, the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the decision that the
couple’s prior agreement, including the provision in
question, should be enforced. The basic reason for
this conclusion was that “advance directives, subject
to mutual change of mind that must be jointly expressed, both minimize misunderstandings and maximize procreative liberty by reserving to the progenitors the authority to make what is in the first instance
a quintessentially personal, private decision.”4 If such
a document evidences informed, mutual consent,
the court ruled, it should be honored by the courts.
In the court’s concluding words:
As they embarked on the IVF program, appellant and
respondent — “husband” and “wife,” signing as such —
clearly contemplated the fulfillment of a life dream of having
a child during their marriage. The consents they signed
provided for other contingencies, most especially that in
the present circumstances the pre-zygotes would be donated to the IVF program for approved research purposes.
These parties have clearly manifested their intention, the
law will honor it.4
SIMILARITIES AND LESSONS

These cases illustrate the two primary ways in which
clinics and courts have tried to avoid the new legal
issues raised by assisted-reproduction techniques:
application of the sperm-donor model of secrecy to
all aspects of infertility treatment, and dependence on
contracts. Both clinics and courts like contracts, because they seem to put private, procreation-related
decision making in the hands of the married couple
and permit the courts simply to interpret and enforce voluntary agreements. The problem, however,
is that much more than contract law is at stake in
these cases. The courts are not simply affirming the
contents of a contract but are implicitly making profound and wide-ranging decisions about the status
of embryos, the interests of children, and the identification and responsibility of their parents. The inadequacy of contract analysis in this area can be seen
by the fact that no court has ever forced any person
936 ·

to fulfill the terms of a surrogate-mother contract, a
custody contract, or a marriage contract by requiring
that the parties be bound by the contractual terms
regardless of their current wishes or the best interests of the children involved.6,7
The California appeals court seemed to be simply
honoring a surrogate-mother contract made before
Jaycee’s conception. In fact, however, the court was
implicitly holding that the determination of motherhood would be governed by the same rules that the
legislature has adopted to determine fatherhood in
the case of sperm donation. The court seemed to see
this as a neutral approach with respect to sex, but
applying the model of sperm donation to women
devalues both pregnancy and childbirth, since according to the court’s analysis, not only the genetic mother (who as a donor of the egg used in the “procreative project” could arguably be considered analogous
to a sperm donor, even though donating eggs is
much more painful and risky than donating sperm)
but also the gestational mother is eliminated from
consideration as the child’s mother. Likewise, the
court decided that because sperm donors have historically had their identities kept secret even from
the children conceived as a result of their “donations,”8 keeping the identities of both the egg donor
and the gestational mother a secret is appropriate.
Because both the primacy of the contract and the
value of secrecy can be disputed, it is not surprising
that the court concluded its opinion with a reference
to Shadowlands rather than to the law. Shadowlands
is a strong play, and its main character, C.S. Lewis,
was a great writer, but to cite the play as a basis for
the proposition that “a deeper relationship” may develop between a man and a woman than that contemplated at the time of a marriage of convenience
misses the point not only of the play itself (which is
about the meaning of suffering) but also of the case
itself (since the marriage had already ended in divorce). For Lewis, the real world was no more than
“the shadowlands” from which we will emerge, like
Plato’s cave-dwelling prisoners, into the afterlife,
where we will finally see reality clearly.9
The California court’s most important insight was
that courts have an extremely difficult time making
meaningful public policy in the realm of assisted reproduction because they are limited to deciding individual disputes after the fact, and that the legislature, which ideally can foresee and prevent disputes, is
therefore the preferred law-making body in this area.
The New York Court of Appeals did not do much
better. The judges seemed to be especially proud of
themselves for affirming the contract (consent form)
the couple had signed (even though it was a technical, boilerplate form that was difficult to understand). But in affirming the contract, the court
failed to examine the implications of its terms for
public policy. For example, although informed con-
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sent is necessary for research involving human embryos, the gamete donors retain the right to withdraw their consent at any time. To the extent that
the consent of both parties is necessary for valid
consent to research (and this is what the consent
form required), the withdrawal of consent by either
party should mean that the research cannot proceed.
It may be that the New York court missed this
point because it adopted the language of the consent form, with its meaningless term “pre-zygotes”
(instead of embryos). Other clinics have used the euphemistic term “pre-embryos,” but virtually everyone has now abandoned the prefix because the most
meaningful distinction is between extracorporeal
embryos (over which male and female gamete providers have equal say) and implanted embryos (over
which the pregnant woman has the ultimate decision-making authority). The terms used often determine the outcome. It is evidence of the court’s confusion that even though the court said it was adopting
the terms used in the consent form, in the opinion,
three different terms are used for the same entities:
embryos, fertilized eggs, and pre-zygotes.
Finally, to the extent that the New York court was
correct in concluding that the couple embarked on
IVF and signed the consent form contemplating
“the fulfillment of a life dream of having a child during their marriage,” their divorce put an end to this
dream and radically altered their circumstances. Divorce would seem to be a sufficient change to call
into question the embryo agreement, like the marriage agreement itself, and to provide each former
spouse with the opportunity to revoke it.
CASE LAW OR LEGISLATION?

These courts arguably did as well as they could,
and reliance on prior contracts as a way to resolve
controversies in assisted reproduction has also been
espoused by leading legal commentators.10 Nonetheless, the California court is correct in asking that the
legislature establish rules in this arena. The court’s
opinion, for example, gives no guidance on what
should happen if the gestational mother or the egg
donor changes her mind and wants to be designated
the legal mother with the rights and responsibilities
to rear Jaycee. Must obstetricians and hospitals locate and interpret contracts to determine who a
child’s legal mother is at the time of birth? Do commerce, money, and contracts really have more to say
about motherhood than pregnancy and childbirth?
If we consider the best interests of children more
important than the best interests of commerce, children will be best protected by a universal rule that
the woman who gives birth to the child is the child’s
legal mother — with, among other things, the right
to make treatment decisions on behalf of the child
and the responsibility to care for the child.11 I believe this not because it is the traditional or natural

rule but because the gestational mother is the only
one of the three potential mothers who must be
present at the child’s birth and available to make decisions on behalf of the child. She is also the only
one of the three potential mothers who has a personal
relationship with the child. Decisions about treatment and care of the child must often be made immediately; the issues of long-term care, relinquishment of parental rights, and adoption can be dealt
with later.
Similarly, the New York court acknowledged in its
opinion that the New York State Task Force on Life
and the Law recently “issued a comprehensive report . . . together with recommendations for regulation . . . addressing a wide range of relevant
subjects.”4 The court, however, took no position on
the recommendations themselves, and it is unclear
from the opinion whether the judges actually had an
opportunity to read the report (which was released
only a week before the court’s opinion was published).12,13
THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE

This year the New York State Task Force issued
the first comprehensive legislative report on assisted
reproduction in the United States.12 Similar reports
were issued in the United Kingdom,14 Australia,15
and Ontario16 more than a decade ago, and Canada
issued a national report in 1993.17 The United States
has been slow to regulate the assisted-reproduction industry because of continuing controversies over abortion and embryo research, as well as our basic belief
that, to a large extent, decisions about assisted reproduction should be left to couples and their physicians.18,19 But certain aspects of these decisions have
such a strong impact on matters of concern to society
— such as child support and care, decisions about
medical treatment and education for children, the
social identity and responsibility of parents, basic informed-consent requirements, and record keeping —
that they require public scrutiny and regulation.12-17
The assisted-reproduction industry caters to the
wishes of adults, and their wishes consistently trump
the interests of children. The abortion model of private decision making has been used to resist the regulation of assisted reproduction (even though what
is sought is the birth of a child, not the termination
of a pregnancy), and the sperm-donor model has
consistently been applied to egg donation, pregnancy,
and childbirth, even though none of them are equivalent.2,6,7 Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the
application of the sperm-donor model to virtually all
assisted-reproduction techniques is the insistence on
secrecy — to such an extent that records about
sperm donors and their donations are routinely kept
from the children conceived as a result of the donations, who are intentionally and systematically deprived of knowledge of their genetic parents.8,17,20
Vol ume 33 9

Numb e r 13

The New England Journal of Medicine
Downloaded from nejm.org at BOSTON UNIVERSITY on November 17, 2021. For personal use only. No other uses without permission.
Copyright © 1998 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved.

·

937

The Ne w E n g l a nd Jo u r n a l o f Me d ic i ne

Secrecy has been the norm in donor insemination
since its introduction.8,12 Worse, parents may be counseled to lie to their children about their genetic heritage, even though family secrets can adversely affect
the entire family.8,12,21-23
The New York State Task Force recommended approximately 60 changes in professional standards
and guidelines, 30 changes in state regulation of
gamete banks, and 11 new state laws.12 It is not necessary to agree with all these recommendations to
appreciate the number of areas that may require regulation. The task force was concerned, for example,
about the growing number of multiple pregnancies
resulting from the use of fertility drugs and the implantation of multiple embryos. These practices can
result in multiple births, which are associated with
increased risks of prematurity and low birth weight,
or in fetal reduction (selective abortion of some of the
fetuses). The task force ultimately could not agree
on how to regulate multiple pregnancies. A private
multidisciplinary group has recently recommended
federal legislation to limit the number of implanted
embryos per cycle to four.24 The task force was also
concerned about the lack of uniform standards for
record keeping, consent procedures and forms, counseling, screening, reporting of success rates, egg donation, and embryo research.
The task force’s most important decision was to
adopt a child-centered perspective that takes seriously the protection of the interests of the children born
as a result of assisted-reproduction techniques — for
example, by identifying the children’s legal parents
and requiring clinics to keep records on behalf of the
children. The most important specific recommendation was that “New York law should clearly provide
that the woman who gives birth to the child is the
child’s legal mother, even if the child was not conceived with the woman’s egg.”12 If this rule had
been in effect in California, the dispute there would
not have occurred, since the gestational mother and
her husband (if she was married) or the genetic father
(if she was single) would have been Jaycee’s legal
parents, and they would have had to relinquish their
parental rights to give her up for adoption. The task
force’s recommendations could also have resolved
the dispute in the New York case, since it recommended that use of frozen embryos always require
the agreement of both gamete providers, thus giving
each veto power.12,25
THE FEDERAL ROLE

More important than the rules proposed by the
task force is its attempt to move the regulation of assisted reproduction out of the shadowlands of private clinics and the public realm of private disputes
(the courts) into the light of public democratic lawmaking. Both the regulation of medicine and family
relations have historically been dealt with under state
938 ·

law, not federal law. It has seemed reasonable for the
states to handle these issues themselves and for the
law to develop on a state-by-state basis. Nonetheless,
to the extent that assisted reproduction has become
big business and to the extent that it is more accurately characterized as a commercial enterprise than
as a medical or family-related enterprise, federal regulation of at least its interstate commercial aspects
deserves consideration.
Other countries that have developed uniform standards for the infertility industry have appointed a committee or commission to study the issues and make
legislative recommendations.14-17 It seems likely that
if we want to consider establishing uniform commercial standards in this country, a similar panel will
have to be appointed by the president. The Advisory
Committee on Human Radiation Experiments provides the best recent model, since it was given a specific charge, had an adequate budget, and received
the cooperation of the relevant federal agencies.26
The states will, of course, continue to have jurisdiction over determining motherhood, fatherhood,
child custody, and related issues of family law. But
national standards of commerce could be developed
for assisted reproduction, as they have for organ transplantation. A national advisory committee on the new
reproductive techniques should consider uniform
national rules that address the following issues: the
content of informed consent in terms of the risks to
parents and children; standard screening and recordkeeping requirements for egg and sperm donation;
the ability of children born as a result of assisted reproduction to learn the identity of their genetic and
gestational parents; research on human embryos; time
limits on the storage of human embryos; the use of
gametes from deceased persons to produce children;
and the addition of eggs and embryos (and possibly
sperm as well) to the list of human tissues that cannot
be purchased or sold in the United States.
C.S. Lewis, who also wrote children’s books, believed that a “bad way” to write for children is to do
so as a special category of “giving the public what it
wants.”28 Likewise, a bad way to protect the children
who have been conceived and born with the assistance of the new reproductive techniques is simply to
provide the adults involved with what they want. In
late 1997, President Bill Clinton signed a federal law
designed to shift the emphasis in adoption practices
from the rights of the biologic parents to the welfare
of the children.28 The assisted-reproduction industry
should move in this direction as well. As with adoption, however, it will probably take federal action to
move children to the center of consideration in the
infertility business.
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